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INTRODUCTION
Moral and political education are often seen äs one another's r ivals.
Moral education calls to mind associations with moral "rearirament" and
"ethical revival" and is usually seen äs the conservative Version of
political education, in which the individual acquires insight into unequal
social relationships. I shall argue that since the appearance of Kohlberg's
theory on moral development and education (the theory of cognitive develop-
ment), this view of the relationship between moral and political education
has become out of date. The most important hypothesis of this contribution
is that whi lst it is true that political education cannot be reduced to
moral education, the didactics of political education should contain the
necessary Stimuli for pupi ls ' moral development. This hypothesis will be
supported by describing the central elements of Kohlberg's theory and by
showing what relationships have been discovered between moral judgments
and political consciousness. Finally, an indication will be given of the
general pedagogical-didacti c principles through which a social studies
course can be patterned on cognitive developmental theory. Supplement! ng
Langeveld (1975) , who in the Netherlands introduced the discussion on the
utility of Kohlberg 's ideas for political education, I wish to show that
influencing moral development should not only be seen äs a form of indirect
political soci al isation, but also äs an integral part of planned political
education.
THE DANGER OF "MORALISING" SOCIAL STUDIES
To Start wi th, the question might be asked why no case is made here for
replacing social studies with moral education, which is happening in the
United States. In recent years, a considerable amount of curriculum material
has been developed that is used within the framework of so-cal led "social
studies" and which is aimed at stimulating moral development. This material
has been tested repeatedly for its effectiveness in connexion with promoting
moral development (cf. Lockwood, 1978) and therefore lacks only the labe!
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"po l i t i c a l educat ion" to provide a new I m p u l s e to the out-of-date practice
of social s tudies , des igned for conveying I n f o r m a t i o n .
Before, however , dec id ing to t ransform ex i s t ing forms and contents of
p o l i t i c a l educat ion on a l a rge scale through this m a t e r i a l , we w o u l d do
wel l to dwel l a moment upon the pecu l i a r notion of pol i t ies upon w h i c h the
spec i f i c Amer ican e n t h u s i a s m for t rans forming "social studies" into "moral
educa t ion" is based. Po l i t i c a l events such äs Watergate and B i l l y g a t e are
c o n t i n u a l l y ascribed to the "moral bankruptcy" the Amer ican people have
f a l l e n v i c t i m to . Not only p o l i t i c i a n s and p o l i t i c a l commentators but also
social scientists Interpret these events äs moral d i l emmas in w h i c h the
actors are assumed to have made the wrong choice (cf . L i c k o n a , 1 9 7 9 ) . Th is
has resulted in a k i n d of "Spu tn ik" effect in the area of mora l i ty : just äs
mathematics and physics i n s t ruc t ion was to p lay a key role in t app ing and
"ref ining" human potential to overcome the "cognitive gap" wi th the Soviet
U n i o n in the s ix t ies , social s tudies must attempt to overcome the "moral gap"
in the seventies and eighties. (From Sputnik to Watergate - Hintjes and
Spiecker , 1979) .
It is, however, questionable whether important poli t ical phenomena can
so easi ly be reduced to solely i n d i v i d u a l moral causes. Looked at from a
social point of view, the reduction of politics to morality has its dangerous
sides, äs Weber demonstrated at the b e g i n n i n g of this Century. From a
psychologi cal po in t of view, such a reduction confl ic ts w i th a v a i l a b l e
empi r i ca l ma te r i a l , äs I sha l l fu r ther demonstrate .
My doubts äs to the eff icacy of subs t i t u t i ng "social s tud ies" w i t h
"moral educat ion" in connexion w i t h s o l v i n g important current po l i t i ca l
Problems do not , however , at all mean that I am not convinced of the
u s e f u l n e s s of moral c u r r i c u l a for p o l i t i c a l educat ion directed towards
s t i m u l a t i n g a cr i t ical p o l i t i c a l a t t i tude . On the bas i s of a v a i l a b l e
theoretical and empi r ica l evidence i t w o u l d seem unques t i onab ly j u s t i f i e d
to pos i t the thesis that p o l i t i c a l educa t ion s h o u l d , in part at least , be
interpreted äs moral e d u c a t i o n . But äs I s h a l l attempt to show in the
e n s u i n g paragraphs , the thesis that moral educat ion c o u l d ent i re ly replace
p o l i t i c a l educa t ion (or vice versa, see Fei Isches, 1977) is based upon an
erroneous t ra in of though t . But f i r s t I s h a l l b r i e f l y review the founda t ion
of all moral c u r r i c u l a , K o h l b e r g 1 s theory of moral deve lopment , and show
that th is controversial theory cannot by any means be set aside äs b e i n g
u n p r o v e n .
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THE COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT
Moral prescnpts are in particular applied when the necessity of a
practical moral choice presents itself, that is, a choice between two or
more alternatives of action within a conflict of interests. A well-known
example of such a conflict is the story of Heinz and his mortally sick
wi fe, who can only be cured by medicine avai lable from a chemist at a
very high price. Heinz has not enough money and wonders whether he should/
may steal the medicine. With the aid of short Sketches of such dilemmas,
Kohlberg investigated the moral development of children and youths. He
bpgan this study in 1955 with approximately /O children in Chicago between
the ages of 10 and 16. He fol lowed this same group of children for more
than 20 years and periodically asked them their reactions to different
moral dilemmas. The responses were analysed in a complex fashion (Kohl-
berg et al., 1976). He investigated whether heteronomous moral thinking
developed into autonomous moral thinking. In the thirties, Piaget (1934)
had already stated that most children undergo development from heteronomy-
behaviour, determined by adults and external rules, to autonomy-behaviour
determined by consciously endorsed and internalised rules.
Kohlberg did, indeed, discover such a development; in addition, he was
able te sketch the general line of development in greater detail. His
development diagram contained the three well-known levels of moral reasomng,
each with two sub- levels:
sub-level 1. "good" is whatever results in the smallest
chance of pumshment ("onentation to
punishment")
1. pre-conventional level
sub-level 2: "good is whatever sat isf ies one 's own
needs ("naive instrumental hedomsm")
sub-level 3: "good" is whatever creates harmonious
relations between people ("good boy,
m ce girl moral ity")
2. conventional level
sub-level 4: 'good" is whatever serves the existing
order ("orientation to authority and
conventions")
sub-level 5: "good" is preserving mutual rights and
obligations fixed "contractually"
("utili tan an contract perspective")
3. post-conventional level
sub-level 6: "good" is acting according to potential
universal values ("um versal isti c
moral ity")
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I describe the three levels äs f o l l o w s :
1. Pre-conventional l e v e l : at th is l e v e l , the ques t ion äs to what is
r ight in a moral d i l emma is u s u a l l y answered by p o i n t i n g to p r e v a i l i n g
ru les , seen äs a sort of iron law of na ture , and the consequences that
break ing those rules w i l l have . In t en t ions and motives are of no impor tance .
If there is the r isk of p u n i s h m e n t w i t h o u t s u f f i c i e n t compensa t ion , th is
considerat ion then determines the u l t ima te d e c i s i o n .
2 . Convent iona l l e v e l : a t t h i s l e v e l , rora l b e h a v i o u r means f o l l o w i n g
and m a i n t a i n i n g rules and expectat ions of the group one be longs to. In a
Tä te r stage, this group perspective is broadened to i n c l u d e a perspect ive
on society äs a w h o l e . An ac t ive main tenance of the p r e v a i l i n g social order,
w i t h a l l its rules and expectat ions, is then the g o a l . At th is second l e v e l ,
i t is no longer the egotis t ical motive of a v o i d i n g p u n i s h m e n t and other
negative consequences for oneself that plays the most impor tan t ro le , but
the very loyal ty to one ' s own group and to society äs a w h o l e .
3. Post-conventional l e v e l : moral b e h a v i o u r is ac t ing accord ing to
general u n i v e r s a l p r i n c i p l e s , va lues and norras. These p r i n c i p l e s are based
upon a general O b l i g a t i o n to the r ights and w e l l - b e i n g of o n e ' s f e l l o w
h u m a n s . A moral prescript s h o u l d be u n i v e r s a l , that is acceptable , in
p r i n c i p l e , to all those i n v o l v e d . The perspect ive is taken of a ra t iona l
i n d i v i d u a l , abs t ract ing from the level of the a c c i d e n t a l l y p r e v a i l i n g socia l
system, and wonder ing w h i c h dec i s ion everyone c o u l d agree to if i t were
unc l ea r what the pos i t i on of each p a r t i c i p a n t w a s .
A formal procedure is suggested here w h i c h can lead to un ive r sa l p r i n c i p l e s
and d e c i s i o n s . The a f f i n i t y w i t h K a n t ' s categorical impera t ive i s o b v i o u s .
Kant , too, assumes that a correct dec i s ion can only be reached via a t hough t -
exper iment in w h i c h one asks onese l f whe ther o n e ' s maxim can be raised to
the level of a un ive r sa l law ( K a n t , 1961).
THE STAGE T H E O R Y
From the descr ip t ion of K o h l b e r g ' s theory above, one cou ld conc lude that
he ac tua l l y did l i t t l e more than conduct semi-s t ruc tured In terv iews wi th
c h i l d r e n of va r ious ages and record the i r responses to d i l e m m a s . These
responses were then c l a s s i f i e d under certain categories, w h i c h were then
l a b e l l e d pre-convent ional , convent iona l , and pos t -convent ional moral i ty.
Ent i re ly w i t h i n the t r ad i t ion of the theory of cogni t ive deve lopment ,
K o h l b e r g attempted to show that the d i f f e r en t types of moral t h i n k i n g
c o u l d not be p laced in a random order. They are not e q u i v a l e n t l eve l s of
a rgumen ta t i on e x i s t i n g a long side of one ano the r . The core of K o h l b e r g ' s
theory is the hypothesis that the three l eve l s form a h ierarchy of so-
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called stages, passed through in a very specific order. Put simply: in terms
of morality, level II is better than level I and. in turn, level III is
better than level II.
For that very reason, Kohlberg 's theory meets wi th resistance from both
the left and the right. Wien studying this theory, "tradi tional" social
scient ists recall Webe r ' s value-free postulate - scientific objectivity and
ethical posit ions are irreconcilable. Scientif ic practice should require
object ive distance from every possib le moral argument and none should be
declared better or mo^e optimal.
From the side of "progressive" social scientists, we raight expect the
Standard reaction that äs a stage theory, the theory raises the post-
conventional structure of reasoning to the level of a universal norm. This
is irreconcilable with the ethical re lat iv ism that is assumed to have become
inevitable through the results of cross-cul tural research. Indeed, if in one
cul ture head-hunting and infanticide are considered virtues and in another
are punished severely, how then is it possib le to judge different value
Systems along culturally independent, universal l ines? Is this not a case
of cultural neo-colonial ism in which the W e s t ' s economic hegemony is
translated into a superionty of western neo-Kantian ethics above all
other (sub) cul tural ethical Systems7 It is inevitable that every stage
theory, whether in the cogmtive, normative or social theoretical field,
should elicit such crit icism. And no wonder, when one considers the apparent
pretention of attributing different values to the reasoning of peoples who
in principle are both individually and (sub) cul turally equal .
But what exactly is meant by stage-theory and what empirical and
philosophi cal evidence is there for it7 The stage-theory is based upon the
fol lowing four assumptions:
1. The stages or levels are passed through in a fixed sequence;
2. the stages are structural who les , that is internally consistent and not
speci f ic to particular situations;
3. the stages appear in a sequence that in principle is envi ronmentally
and culturally independent;
4. the stages can be placed not only psychological ly but also ethically in
an hierarchical sequence (Kohlberg, 1969).
There is considerable evidence available to Support the first assumption.
Cross-sect ional and longitudinal research do, indeed, show that older
children more frequently reason at the higher levels than do younger
children. In the course of their development, most children slowly but
surely appear to advance in the direction of a post-conventional morality.
Regression in this course of development hardly ever occurs. What does
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occur with very many children and youths is a kind of premature fixation
on a somewhat lower level of moral judgement than the post-conventional
level. In attempts at stimulating moral development through didactic means,
it also appeared that children progress Step by step, never skipping more
than one sub-level at a time or regressing.
With respect to the second assumption - that stages form structural
wholes - the evidence is far less convincing. As I also ascertained in my
own study (Van IJzendoorn, 1980), there are often large individual
differences in moral level between the dilemmas. This may point to a
certain connexion between levels of reasoning and personal experiences
with specif ic situations. It is possib le that a moral dilemma over a
mortally s ick woman calls to mind less relevant personal experiences than
a moral dilemma over the Obligation to keep a promise once made or over
the proverbial white lie. A greater involvement with the subject of a
dilemma may therefore lead to subtler, more deliberate reasoning at a
higher level .
The assumption that morality develops in a universally uniform fashion
has been tested through cross-cul tural study in such places äs Taiwan,
Mexico and Turkey. It appears, initially at least, that the same pattern
appears in different cultures, but that in non-western cultures, the level
that moral development actually attains is somewhat lower. In such cultures,
for example, there is hardly a trace of post-conventional morality. Such
results would support this assumption only to a very limited degree. Indeed,
it is impossible to prove that in those cultures, post-conventional morality
is ever achieved. This last stage would then not be universal [lj.
This same problem occurs with the assumption that cognition develops
universally in the direction of formal-operational thinking, äs Piaget
repeatedly purported. In this case äs wel l , the avai lable cross-cul tural
evidence is inadequate. However, support for this assumption is sought in
particular in Substantive analyses of the different cognitive structures,
which do, indeed, lead to better and better Solutions to ever more
complicated problems in the interaction between man and nature. Looked
at from the point of view of logic, concrete operations simply do have
more limited applications than formal operations. At a concrete operational
level, problems in understanding certain natural phenomena, äs for example
oscillation, are demonstrably insolvable, whilst through formal operations
the sarae problem resolves itself without difficulty. In o therwords , the
superiority of the highest cognitive stage can be more easily demonstrated
than that of the highest moral stage. And yet, Kohlberg also attempts to
provide Substantive arguments for this presumed moral hierarchy and for the
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superiority of post-conventional morality. The higher you go in the
hierarchy, the more stable the balance between the individual and his
or her social environment, resulting from the different level of moral
reasoning. The higher levels are capable of so lv ing more moral problems
more completely than are the lower levels. Conventional moral thinking
reaches limits when individuals and groups can no longer identify them-
selves with prevailing laws. Mithin the level of conventional reasoning,
fundamental changes in law or in the prevailing values Systems are hardly
feasible. There are no external criteria upon which proposals for change
can be tested. In that way, the post-conventional level inevitably attains
the highest position in the developmental logic of morality. In the case
of the well-knowndilemma of Heinz and his mortally sick wife, it would
be morally and legally offensive to steal the medicine, based upon the
prevailing Systems of values and laws. Only by going beyond the perspective
of the system in the direction of universal ethics can such a case provide
us with new perspectives. I doubt, though, whether this would eliminate
all moral problems and result in an idyllic harmony between the rational
individual and his social environment, äs Kohlberg suggests. The moral
dilemma concerning Heinz and his wife contains relatively little Information,
which does injustice to the complexity of a real moral dilemma. Wrongly, all
kinds of ramifications, for example those concerning larger social structures,
are left out of consideration.
In the case of Heinz 's dilemma, it would seem obvious to also consider
the medical health system, which apparently allows private individuals
to make large profits on medicines. If a truly universal solution is to
be arrived at, such matters äs licensing, scarcity of the raw materials
for the medicine, the health insurance system, etc., should play some role
in reaching a decision, especially at the highest moral level. Contrary to
what Kohlberg suggests, äs one 's perspective broadens äs a result of
advancing moral development, moral problems become more complex instead
of more easily solvable. There is then no evidence at all of a more stable
balance characteristic of higher moral reasoning levels, at least not from
the point of view of the indiv idual 's functioning and experience. Whi ls t
cognitive development may bring increased ease in relating to one's
surroundings, with moral development the opposite may even be the case.
Taken to extremes, it is just possible that in a pre-conventional or
conventional society, individuals at post-conventional moral levels are
the very ones running the risk of having to pay for their moral decisions
with their l ives. An example Kohlberg at times a lso refers to is that of
Martin Luther King.
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PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS WITH REGARD TO THE STAGE THEORY
However, with respect to the central thesis of the stage theory, many
things remain unclear, in particular the hierarchy of the different levels
of morality. If, indeed, the Statement, "some people have been arrested
in their development" is to have any meaning, this hierarchy must be
presumed to exist. Only within the framework of this hierarchy is it
meaningful to speak of interrupted development, otherwise we should be
dealing with different but equivalent terminal points per individual.
This also applies to the assumption in which is stated that the stage-
theory applies independent of environment or culture. Only if the
developmental logic mentioned earlier is accepted äs a departure point
is it possible to describe other cultures äs restraining and block ing
moral development in a certain area, indicating the absence of post-
conventional morality.
An additional problem is the following: even if everyone in all
cultures should attain the post-conventional level , it remains questionable
to what extent conclusions can be drawn concerning the normative value of
this level based on that fact alone. In that case, we should be guilty of
what Hume referred to äs "naturalistic fallacy" in its narrowest sense:
deducing what should be from what is, that is, making the logically
untenable Jump from purely descriptive preraises to prescriptive conclusions.
One cannot conclude that a certain type of moral reasoning has an automatic
ethical superiority solely on the basis of quantitative data, namely that
most or even all adul ts employ it. It would then seem feasible that what
we have called post-conventional morality may, for whatever reason, be the
result of something we might have to characterise äs collective moral
regression. Simply because everyone smokes more and more does not mean
that smoking more is necessarily better. In judging the "value" of smoking,
an external factor - in this case a theory on the optimal functioning of
a healthy organism - wi l l be the most important criterion. The theory of
moral development, too, cannot avoid the use of such external criteria.
This theory, too, cannot base its central assumption on the hierarchy and
universality of the stages on empirical data alone, but is dependent, äs
well, upon philosophical arguments. No theoretical structure - not even in
the natural sciences - can be completely reduced to so-cal led "bare facts".
In every paradigm or research Programme, norms, values and metaphysical
convictions play a central role, äs we have learnt from recent developments
in the philosophy of science (Kühn, Lakatos) . There are empirically grounded
indications - but no water-tight evidence - that the stage-theory is correct.
These indications can be supplemented with philosophical considerations and,
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conversely, empirical data can provide support for these philosophical
arguments The theory of justice of the neo-Kantian John Rawls (1971)
in particular, provides an important philosophical confirmation of the
superionty of post-conventional moral thinking. The most important
procedural feature of post-conventional reasoning is the "ideal role-
taking procedure", yielding correct moral decisions. This procedure
consists of putting oneself in the place of every person involved in the
moral problem and imagimng the wishes each person might express with
respect to solving that problem. In addition, one must imagine that one
does not know to which party in the conflict one will belong and, from
that position, decide which wishes one would choose to retain. The wishes
remaimng after this sift ing process merit the designation "universal"
and are therefore just.
Rawls employs a similar procedure in constructing his theory of justice.
He makes clear that from the procedural principles of a post-conventional
moral ity, a System of ethics can be constructed that, without doubt, can
rival any other System. To my rrnnd, his tightly constructed System has
until now withstood the test of crit icism splendidly (see, for a more
extensive grouding of this thesis, Cohn, 1982). Of course, this also has
consequences for Kohlberq's theory of moral develooment, and in particular
for his claim that the hierarchical nature of his moral stages can be
defended against any ethical relativism. Indeed, this claim gains in
credibility if its core appears to be able to form the foundation of one
of the most prormsing modern neo-Kantian Systems of ethics. Conversely, it
is no small support for an ethical System if, looked at ontogenetically,
individuals can acquire insight into and a posit ive outlook on its procedural
foundation and employ this foundation äs the most important criterion in
reaching moral decisions, after having passed through certain preliminary
stages (see Kohlberg, 1973).
THE THEORY OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS
Following this short sketch of the theory of cognitive development, this
section deals with the question whether there is any reason to bel ieve that
there is a connexion between the level of moral judgement and political
consciousness. If this connexion can be made plausible, it would seem obvious
to structure political consciousness, in part using pedagogi cal-di dacti c
principles äs developed and evaluated for moral education.
In the United States in particular, several different research projects
have examined the relation between such variables äs cognition and morality
on the one hand and political attitude and/or behaviour on the other.
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I shall briefly discuss a number of them here to show that it is very
much worthwhile to approach the problem of didactics for political
education from a cogm'tive-development theoretical point of view. I
shall also show that cognitive-development theoretical variables do
not entirely coincide with variablesof political consciousness . Haan
et al., for example, investigated the level of moral judgment of
participants in the American "Free Speech Movement". They discovered
that the greater majority of politically active students made their
judgments on the basis of post- or pre-conventional morality, whi ls t
the moral conventionalists (sub-level 3 and 4) were clearly in the
minority (Fishkin et al., 1973) . Another study of Haan et al . (1968)
showed that respondents with more radical political opinions made
judgments on the basis of either post- or pre-conventional morality.
Fontana and Noel (1973) noticed a positive relationship between moral
level and political activism in their study among university staff
members. This relationship was, however, not found among the Student
group. In this case, it appeared that a critical political attitude
was not related to a morality based on principles. The more conservatively
inclined students did, however, conduct their reasoning mostly at a
conventional level and rarely at a pre-conventional level . Fishkin et
al . (1973) , too, found a highly positive correlation between political
conservatism and conventional morality, and a negative correlation
between the former and a morality based on principles. On the other
hand, pre-conventional participants more often chose for violent
radicalism. Sull ivan and Quarter (1972) showed that, bearing in mind
hybrid sub-categories more difficult to classify, morality has a
positive linear relationship to the extent of progressiveness in
political attitudes. Döbert and Nunner-Winkler (1975) showed that
morality based on principles does, indeed, more frequently correlate
with a critical attitude towards exist ing social relationships than
does conventional morality. Kühn et al . (1977) discovered that morality
had a positive linear correlation to political attitude, the correlation
between cognition and political attitude being greater than between
morality and political attitude. Eisenberg-Berg (1979) found a posit ive
correlation between the extent of progressiveness of political attitude
and the level of moral reasoning among her female respondents. No such
correlation was discovered with her male respondents. Tsujimoto (1979)
found that conventionalists were more often inclined to oersonify social
injustice than were pre- and post-conventional ists, that is, to blame
individuals for political social problems. In all the above studies,
35
however, it may be remarked that, τ η particular, the variable "political
attitude" was defined and/or operational ised in a dubious fashion.
Fishkin et al., for instance, actually managed to operational ise political
consciousness using a series of such populär Slogans äs "kill the pigs"
and "make love not war " . Kühn et al . narrowed the notion of political
attitude down to the attitude toward such forms of government äs
democracy, oligarchy etc., and asked just four short questions about
it. In a study I did among pupils in Berlin employing a more legitimate
operationalisation of the notion "polit ical attitude", it appeared quite
possible to demonstrate a positive linear relation between the level of
moral reasoning and the progressi veness of political attitudes. Cogmtive
level, however, appeared to correlate sigmficantly less strongly with
this attitude (Van Uzendoorn, 1979) . In brief, in view of the concurrence
of the results of the research projects mentioned above, employing
extremely divergent research designs, it may be concluded that the level
of moral reasoning in particular is important to political consciousness.
The higher the level of moral development, the more critical are the
attitudes of adolescents towerds social injustice. The results with
respect to the correlation between cognitive level and political attitude
are not uniform. Further research shall have to provide the answers in
this area. However, theoretical developments show that in any case, the
transition from concrete to formal operational reasomng is of crucial
importance for a better developed political consciousness, which is
capable of doi ng justice to the complexity of political and social Problems
(Adelson, 1975, Crain/Crain, 1974, Harten, 1977, Habermas, 1976, Merelman,
1976, Van Uzendoorn, 1978) .
From the research matenal collected, the conclusion can also be
drawn that the cognitive development theoretical var iables - moral i ty
and cognition - can never explain more than a portion of the variance
of the variable "polit ical att i tude". Correlations fluctuate between
.20 and .50, with a few exceptions above or below. In other words, there
were hardly any cases in which more than 25% of the total variance was
explained by these var iables. Political attitude can therefore not be
explained by these factors alone, it would appear that emotional factors
are also of importance, which can explain a considerable part of the
perception of polit ical "facts" and therefore contribute indirectly to
the development of a polit ical attitude. Sarat (1975) , for example, found
that the "fear level" ( in part a determinant of the level of self-
confidence) influenced the development of polit ical reasomng. In my
Berlin study, I discovered that the development of identity, in the
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Eriksonian sense of the word, influenced the political attitude of the
group of adolescents I investigated (Van IJzendoorn, 1978). Merelman
(1976) assumed on theoretical grounds that such psycho-dynamic factors
äs sex-role development, "imoulse control" and the extent of emotional
detachment from the nuclear family (cf. Dobert and Winkler , 1975) ,
together with cogmtive factors, lead to a more defimtely shaped
political ideology. All of this points to the limitations of instruction
in political education based solely upon cogmtive developmental theory.
In future, it should therefore be our aim to integrate this approach to
the didactics of political education wi th one more based upon grouo-
and psycho-dynami es.
THE NECESSITY OF INTEGRATING MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION
Even if it has been shown above that such variablesas morality and
cognition explain a portion of the variance of oolit ical attitude, it
is still the question whether or not instruction in oolit ical education
should include them. Quite apart from the problem that research has yet
to demonstrate whether or not moral and cogmtive development are really
"causal" factors or are to be regarded äs epi-phenomena, or perhaps even
the result of a particular level of polit ical consc iousness, one can
without question be sceptical of the possibil i ty of indirectly stimulating
the development of political attitudes, that is, by influencing the co-
variates. It is, indeed, possible that the development of political
consciousness has its owndynamics, which can only be stimulated by very
specif ic means. As yet, there is no empirical evidence avai lab le upon
wich we can base the conclusion that political consciousness develons
gradual ly through the disruption of temporary equilibria (Piaget 1976) .
In other words, it is questionable whether polit ical consciousness belongs
to the group of cogni ti ve-development theoretical variables whi ch we more
or less know to develop in a dialectical fashion (Van IJzendoorn, 1980).
For example, it is just possible that cogniti ve-development theoretical
variables correlate rather strongly with nail-biting or thumb-sucking.
This would not necessari ly incline us to regard such a correlation äs a
basis for a strategy aimed at influencing change in such behaviour
At a theoretical level, however, there is support for the thesis that
cogniti ve-development theoretical variables are more important to political
consciousness than to nail-biting or thumb-sucking. Elsewhere, I have
argued at length that formal-operational reasomng is a necessary
prerequisite for a critical political attitude, in äs much äs essential
political myths (for example the myth of equal opportunity) endure
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because raany individuals are incapable of probabi l isti c reasomng. In the
sarae fashion it has been shown that a post-conventional morality is a
necessary condition for fundamental cnt ic ism of a System based on
principles relatively independent of any accidentally prevailing social
System Thus, such pnnciples serve äs a tertium comparatioms, äs a
relatively autonomous Standard. Moral arguments at sub- levels 3 and 4
can only lead to inherent crit insm of the System, any disfunctiomng
of that System being traced back to individuals serving äs interference
factors.
In short, it is possib le, theoreti cal ly in any case, to make plausible
that, with respect to the developraent of politncal consciousness, morality
and cogmtion can provide a "cei l ing effect." Because they restrict the
complexity and breadth of politcal cnticism consi derably, concrete-
operational and conventional reasomng can impede the development of a
critical political attitude In the absence of the prerequisi tes for
continued political development, it is better to concentrate on the
removal of impediments in that area before attempting to influence political
attitudes directly. This would argue for instruction in political education
that is imtially aimed at st imulating moral and cognitive development. Such
Stimulation could create the necessary conditions for the development of a
political consciousness that would otherwise quickly reach its limits.
Research of Faust and Arbuthnot (1978) and Walker and Richards (1979)
show that such a "ceil ing effect" is not at all unrealistic. These
researchers establ ished that moral education loses i ts effecti veness äs
soon äs the cogmtive requirements for higher moral development are no
longer met. Faust and Arbuthnot discovered that participants reasomng
at sub-level 3 were unable to get äs much out of a moral curnculuni. Those
using concrete-operational reasomng hardly profited from this additional
Programme. On the other hand, those reasomng at a formal-operational level
got a great deal out of the moral curriculum This group can therefore be
referred to äs the "moral underachievers," inasmuch äs their moral develop-
ment did not reach the "cogmtive cei l ing." That same "cei l ing effect"
was detected by Walker and Richards, who endeavoured to stimulate the
moral development of a number of participants through educational programmes.
They concluded: "Exposure to high levels of moral reasomng wil l not produce
transitions unless the cogmtive prerequisi tes have been attained." (p 102).
It is clear that if morality and cogmtion bear the same relationship to
political consciousness äs cogmtion to morality (and "role-taking" to
cognit ion), a similar "ceil ing effect" may be expected for political
education. It is in part due to this "ceil ing effect" that instruction
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in political education shall have to incorporate the Stimulation of
cognitive and moral development.
CONCLUSION
Within the framework of the theory of cognitive development, much
research has been done into didactic methods of promoting cognitive
and moral development (for example Wassermann, 1978, Langer, 1979,
Hersh et al ., 1979) . Elsewhere I have summarised a general design for
stimulating cognitive and moral development äs fo l lows:
- maximal isation of the opportuni ties for co-operation, in particular
among children of the same aqe;
- Stimulation of the opportuni ties for constructive activities of a
non-verbal or verbal nature, depending upon the age of the target group;
- expansion of the number of cognit ive and moral conflict experiences in
an anxiety-reducing group atmosphere;
- optimal isation of the democratic structure of the school, so that the
'hidden curriculum' a l lows experiences with higher rather than lower
moral structures (Van IJzendoorn, 1980) .
In view of the case presented above, these principles should in some way
be incorporated into the curriculum of political education. The conclusion
is that political education shall have to devote attention to the cognitive
and moral prerequisites of a critical political attitude.
11 wil l be clear to anyone with first-hand, day to day teaching experience
that, in putting this theory into the practice of political education, a
good many problems may arise. I should like to mention two here. The first
concerns the way education will meet the requirement that pupils should
gain practical experience in so lv ing real-life moral and, in particular,
political problems, without going beyond the competence of the school or
the teacher. In a pari iamentary democracy, there are markedly fewer
opportunities for intensive, active parti cipation in political events,
for young people in particular, than there are for active experimentation
with the world of physical objects ("cognit ive act iv i t ies") or for
practical experience with individual confl icts (moral act iv i t ies). This
is very likely one of the reasons for the exist ing "political decalage"
(Padioleau, 1976) , that is, the gap between the political consciousness
our society demands and the one that is actually developed. The second
problem concerns the demands that are made upon the teacher. Rightly,
Holtmann (1982) has pointed out that teachers are in danger of getting
the worst end of the bargain with theories making too great a demand,
for example, upon their skill in assess ing their pupi ls ' level of moral
39
judgment Mithin a short penod of time. More consequential still is the
related problem of the teacher 's being asked to expose the "immoral i ty"
of a school System, i e. its hidden curnculum, of which he or she is a
representati ve and Mithin which he or she must continue to work Looked
at from the pupi l 's point of V iew, the teacher must then perform the
frustrating role of both exponent and critic of the s c h o o l ' s , and
soc ie ty 's "double morality".
These two problems in integrating moral and political education
force us to put the pretentions of a cogm ti ve-development theoretical
view of political education into perspective. Immediately usable
instructional methods are not avai lable and can only be developed
through labonous and time-consuraing educational research äs conducted
by Kohlberg among teachers and pupils (Kohlberg et al., 1978) Due to
the "cei l ing effect" through which pupi ls ' cogmtive and moral
development sets limits upon the effecti veness of political education,
such didactic experiments are, despite all the problems, of utmost
importance to the theory and practice of political education
NOTES
l We must hesitate to draw the conclusion that the moral development
in non-western cultures attains a lower level . It is possible that
the Instruments for measuring moral development are not äs 'culture-
free' äs they would have to be for Implementation of cross-cultural
research.
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ABSTRACT
In this article it is shown that pupil 's moral and cogmtive development
may constitute a "cei l ing effect" in political education. Conventional
morality and concrete-operational reasoning seem to hinder the development
of cntical political consciousness. Political education should contain
the necessary stimulants for pupi ls ' moral and cogmtive development.
Kohlberg's empincally and phi losophi cal ly wel l-grounded theory provides
some relevant didactic principles.
